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Abstract:
In this paper the new member problem faced by the regional fisheries
management organisations is discussed for a typical highly migratory species: the
northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. The analysis is based on simulation and optimisation
results from a bio-economic model.
The results, for both the East and the West Atlantic stocks, show that presently
the threat of the new members is not relevant for the breakdown of the cooperative
management. This is due to the very low level of the stock, which makes non-
cooperation a low payoff strategy. As the optimal cooperative strategy calls for an
initial harvest moratorium the threat becomes progressively more relevant, showing
that this is a dynamic problem which is aggravated in the long run.
Two possible solutions for this problem are simulated: “transferable
membership” and “waiting period”.  The simulation results show that a “transferable
membership” scheme, if properly implemented, is fully efficient in protecting the
cooperative agreements of the regional fisheries organisations from the free rider
actions of the prospective new members. The “waiting period”, although protecting
the member countries generally does not preclude such behaviours.
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21- Introduction:
The successive cases of over-exploitation of straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks1 that followed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS-1982), revealed the inadequacies of its Provisions relating to these species.
In order to assess the problems related to the conservation and management of
these two transboundary fishery resources, the United Nations convened the “U.N.
inter-governmental Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (1993-95)”. In 1995 the Conference adopted an Agreement for the
implementation of the Provisions on UNCLOS-1982, relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (U.N. Agreement,
hereafter). According to the U.N. Agreement, regional fisheries management
organisations (RFMO) should form the basic bodies of conservation and management
of these species (Munro, 1998). These organisations should integrate both the coastal
states and the distant water fishing nations (DWFN) effectively interested in the
fishery. Their management competence should include both the exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) and the high seas.
The U.N. Agreement sets a "few plain rules" (Balton, 1999), which are pertinent
for the new entrants phenomenon. The first rule is that all States whose vessels fish
for the marine stocks regulated by RFMOs should either join these organisations or, at
a minimum, apply its management regime to their flag vessels. The second rule is that
RFMOs should be open to all States with a real interest in the fisheries concerned.
The final rule follows from the others: only member states of the RFMOs, and the
                                                 
1 The highly migratory stocks move to and from the EEZs and the high seas, it includes mainly the six
major tuna species. Straddling stocks are also found in the EEZ and the high seas but tend to migrate in
smaller areas than the tunas.
3states that apply the fishing restrictions adopted by those organisations, shall have
access to the regulated fishery resources.
According to Munro (1999) the U.N. Agreement left unsolved two important
issues to the long-term economic viability of the RFMOs. These are referred as the
“interloper” and the new member issues. The former concerns the policing of vessels
of states, which are non-members of the RFMO, whereas the latter concerns the
possibility of new members attempting to join the organisation.
This paper is focused on the new member issue and addresses the case of a
typical highly migratory species: the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna. Under the legal
regime of the U.N. Agreement the new members appear as a relevant threat to the
cooperative agreements, as the members of the RFMOs do not have the right to bar
their access2.
 Two possible solutions for this problem are discussed: “transferable
membership”, and “waiting period”. In the first, a system is implemented in which the
members get transferable property rights over the stock. Thus a prospective new
member would have to purchase quota share in order to enter the fishery. In the
second, the new member must go through a waiting period before enjoying the
benefits from the fishery.
 The paper is organised as follows. The following section presents an economic
approach to management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks (section 2.1)
and to the new member issue (section 2.2). In section 3, this approach is applied to the
Eastern Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. The optimal use of the species under a
cooperative management scenario is addressed (section 3.1). Then the new member
                                                 
2 The U.N. Agreement permits members to bar the access of new members only if the new
member refuses to adopt the RFMO management regime.
4 threat to the cooperative agreement is evaluated (section 3.2). The simulation results
of the two proposed solutions, “transferable membership” and “waiting period” are
discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. In section 4, a similar analysis is
directed to the Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. Finally, section 5 presents some
concluding remarks.
2- Economic Approach
2.1 The Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
According to Munro (1999) the economics of the management of straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks is still at an early stage of development. The reason
behind it is that the management problem of these particular resources is a relatively
new one.
The research on transboundary fish resources has been mainly centred on shared
fish stocks (resources that cross the EEZ of several countries). Only recently the
problem of the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks was
addressed by the economists (e.g. Kaitala and Munro (1993); Munro (1999)).
The studies concluded that the economics of the non-cooperative management
of “shared stocks” could be applied with little change to the non-cooperative
management of the straddling/highly migratory fish stocks. The theory of non-
cooperative games is the basic tool used to predict the consequences of non-
cooperation. In most cases the non-cooperative game presents the features of the well
known “The Prisoner Dilemma” and its outcome is the over-exploitation of the
species.
Generally, the cooperative management of these species is also a very relevant
scenario, as its payoffs tend to exceed those of non-cooperation. In this analysis the
5theory of cooperative games is the central tool. Concerning these games there is a
fundamental difference between the shared fish stocks and the straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks. Neither the number nor the nature of the “players”, of a
cooperative game on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, can be assumed to
be constant over time - as opposed to their natural stability in the shared fish stocks
problems. The cooperative solutions of the highly migratory stocks are, thus,
challenged by the instability on the nature and number of the players.
2.2 The New Member Issue
The possibility of new members attempting to join the RFMOs is a threat to the
long run viability of the cooperative agreements. This threat emerges especially from
the highly mobile DWFN fleets and was left unsolved by legal regime of the UN
Agreement - under which the members of a RFMO do not have the right to bar the
access of a prospective new member.
Although the new member issue remains unresolved (Munro, 1999), some
interesting results can be found in the literature. Kaitala and Munro (1997) show that,
when a RFMO is being established, the expected payoffs of cooperation may fall
bellow the thread point payoffs, if a prospective new member must be admitted to the
RFMO and must be given a share of the resource harvest.
Orebech et al. (1998) states that Article 8 of the U.N. Agreement requires that a
cooperative new member "must be offered a just and reasonable share of the TAC".
But the U.N. Agreement does not specify what a “just and reasonable share” is, or if a
price could be applied to it. In fact, if entrance can be made at zero cost the problem
of the free rider emerges and the RFMO’s cooperative agreement could be fatally
undermined.
6Regarding possible solutions to this problem Kaitala and Munro (1997) refers to
the terms of entry for prospective new members suggested in a draft convention (UN,
1993) by a group of coastal states during the U.N. Fish Stocks Conference. The
authors specially emphasise two of these terms: “transferable membership” and the
“waiting period”. In the first, the charter members declare the transboundary stock to
be fully utilised. Therefore, a prospective new member may participate in the fishery
only if one of the members relinquishes its share. In the second, the new member is
allowed to enter the RFMO but must go through a waiting period before enjoying
benefits from the fishery. Both these solutions are considered as compatible with the
Agreement emerged from the Conference.
In relation to the “transferable membership” solution, Kaitala and Munro
(1997) refers that it is not reasonable to expect that coastal states may transfer their
membership, but the DWFN due to the mobility of their fleets can certainly do so.
Another relevant aspect is that the DWFN will require a payment in order to transfer
its share. Thus this solution is based on the creation of “de facto property rights” for
the members of the RFMO, in which the quotas would take some of the attributes of
individual transferable quotas (ITQ).
The use of ITQ systems in ocean fisheries is relatively recent and it is worth to
outline a few aspects of its history. The first comprehensive ITQ system was
implemented in New Zealand in 1986, and was followed in Australia, Canada, Iceland
and other countries.
In the literature, ITQ applications have progressively spread (e.g. Weninger
(1998); Gauvin and Burges (1994)). Generally the authors conclude that the ITQ
systems bring substantial efficiency gains, namely it provides mechanisms to
eliminate redundant capital and restructure the fleet composition.
7Christy (1996) relates the advent of the property rights based systems, such as
the ITQs, with the natural economic rationalisation of ocean fisheries. The author
predicts the death rattle of open access and in his opinion the TACs are only a stage in
the development of management from licensing to property rights.
With the new legal framework of the U.N. Agreement the use of payment
schemes, such as the ITQs, to solve the new member issue is clearly a possible
economic solution.
Regarding the “Waiting period”, Kaitala and Munro (1997) conclude, through a
theoretical scenario, that this mechanism may not be very promising in eliminating the
threat that the new members pose to the cooperative agreements.
3 – The New Members in the East Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fishery
Throughout this section the new member problem is discussed for East stock of
the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery. The results are based on a multi-gear and
age structured bio-economic model developed for this species (Pintassilgo, 1999).
3.1 The Cooperative Management
As recommended in the UN Agreement the bluefin tuna has been managed by a
RFMO – the International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT). This organisation, established in 1969, adopted over the years many
resolutions and recommendations regarding the management and conservation of the
bluefin tuna, for both the East and West Atlantic (Duarte et al., 1998). Nonetheless,
these measures have not been effective, as weren’t respected by the member and non-
members parties.
8In this section it is assumed that only the ICCAT members participate in the
fishery and implement an optimal cooperative solution. This solution corresponds to
the maximum Total Net Present Value (TNPV) of the grand coalition (formed by all
the ICCAT members).
Following the approach, presented in Duarte et al. (1999), the ICCAT members
are aggregated into three main players: European Union (EU), Distant Water Fishing
Nations (DWFN) and Other Coastal States (OCS).  It is assumed that the player’s
shares in the total catch of each gear remain as in the base year (1995).
The optimal policy is set in terms of a TAC, as this is the main policy
instrument used by the ICCAT and other fisheries organisations world-wide. A
constant gear structure is considered in which the TAC is divided by gear as in the
base year.
In the optimisation the TNPV is maximised for a 50 period3 horizon and the
TAC is considered to be variable during the first 25 years and constant thereafter. For
each year a precautionary limit on total catches is defined as a 40,000 MT4.
Given this framework the optimal policy, for a 4% discount rate, is to declare an
initial harvest moratorium of 5 periods and harvest 40,000 MT thereafter. The optimal
TAC and the stock evolution are presented in Graph 1.
                                                 
3 As in this paper the TAC is considered to be variable during the first 25 years, the simulation period
was extended from 25 periods (Pintassilgo, 1999) to 50 periods in order not to bias the values of the
latest TACs, towards the upper limits.
4 Historical data show that catches above this limit tend to lead biomass to depletion. The model
simulations also show that, with the present gear mix, 40,000 MT is close to a maximum sustainable
catch, after a stock recovery (through an initial harvest moratorium).
9Graph 1
As it can be seen from Graph 1, the optimal policy results in a significant stock
recovery. The progressive trend of the stock towards stabilisation, after the initial
recovery, points out that 40,000 MT is, for the particular level and composition of the
stock after the moratorium, close to a maximum sustainable catch.
In order to evaluate the role of the discount rate in the results, 10% and 20%
discount rates are also considered. With these rates the optimal policy is similar but
with a shorter harvest moratorium: 4 and 3 periods respectively. Table 1 presents the
payoffs of each player in the optimum cooperative strategy.
Table 1: Payoffs in the Cooperative Solution
Discount rate
4% 10% 20%
EU 1327.1 484.2 177.6
DWFN 503.3 185.5 70.1
OCS 589.2 215.0 78.8
Total 2419.5 884.7 326.5
Values in 106 USD
One first conclusion, from table 1 is that the NPV varies significantly with the
discount rate, although the optimal policy is similar. It is, nonetheless, worth to note
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that these results are optimal with the precautionary limits on catches. In their
absence, high discount rates imply optimal policies, which increase substantially the
catches in the short run and leads the stock to depletion.
The importance of precautionary limits on catches is clearly emphasised in the
UN Agreement (Tahindro, 1999). In a context of a world-wide over-fishing, the UN
Agreement provides “Guidelines for application of precautionary reference points in
the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks”. In particular it refers to conservation or limit reference points, which sets
boundaries intended to constrain harvesting within safe biological limits, allowing the
stocks to produce Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).
3.2 The New Member Threat
Kaitala and Munro (1997) show that if the only condition for prospective new
members to achieve membership in the RFMO is a willingness to accept its
management program, then cooperative resource management could most certainly be
at serious risk. The authors show, with an application of a Nash bargaining scheme (in
which the gains from cooperation are divided equally among the players), that the
anticipation of prospective new members can destroy the incentives to a cooperative
management of the resource.
In this section a similar approach is conducted for the East Atlantic bluefin
tuna fishery but, instead of a Nash bargaining scheme, it is assumed that the ICCAT
determines a TAC by gear and each player has a right to a share of it. These shares are
not transferable and side payment schemes are not feasible.
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The new member problem concerns specially the possibility of distant water
fishing nations that might want to join the ICCAT. Therefore, it is assumed that the
new members are DWFN which:
i) Use only longline gear;
ii) Have fleets similar to the ones already in the fishery;
iii) Call for entry in the ICCAT at the end of the harvest moratorium;
iv) Agree to follow the ICCAT regime;
v) Receive a share of the longline quota5;
Regarding assumption v) it is worth to say that in a simpler scenario where the
TAC is issued by country and is not divided by gear (as in the present ICCAT policy),
the new members would naturally receive a share of the total catch. The simulation
results proved that, for both scenarios, the results are qualitatively similar.
Nonetheless, if the TAC were not divided by gear, the effects of the new members
would be more evenly distributed among the players and not so concentrated on the
DWFN, which dominates the longline gear.
Let us now suppose that the players are rational and therefore, if the entry of a
new member is anticipated, they will evaluate if its payoff under cooperation exceeds
that of non-cooperation.
It is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that if one of players breaks the
agreement all the others will react with a non-cooperative strategy. As in Kaitala and
Munro (1997) no cooperative sub-coalitions are considered.
Let us also suppose that the new members will not enter the fishery if non-
cooperation starts at the beginning of the game.
                                                 
5 The other players share on the longline quota decrease in that proportion.
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In this framework, if condition (1) holds, for any of the original members, the
anticipated entry of new members will lead the players to non-cooperative behaviour.
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In order to analyse condition (1), the non-cooperative6 and the cooperative
strategies were simulated, for different shares of the new members. The results are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs by Player in the Presence of New Members at t=0
Non Coop. Cooperative - New member share on the longline quota
0% 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
E.U. -8.8 1327.1 1308.3 1270.8 1233.2 1195.7 1158.2
DWFN 30.2 503.3 453.0 352.3 251.7 151.0 50.3
O.C.S. -3.0 589.2 573.0 540.5 508.1 475.7 443.3
N.M. - - 85.3 255.9 426.5 597.1 767.7
Total 18.4 2419.5 2419.5 2419.5 2419.5 2419.5 2419.5
Values in 106 USD
                                                 
6  The payoffs for this strategy differ slightly from those presented in Duarte et al. (1999) as the
modeling of the last period was revised.
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A major conclusion emerges from Table 2: even if the new members receive a
considerable share of the longline quota, the original members would still prefer a
cooperative strategy, instead of a non-cooperative one. This is due to the very low
level of the stock in the beginning of the game, which makes non-cooperation a low
payoff strategy.
Table 2 also shows that with a cooperative agreement, in this scenario, the
DWFN are the most penalised with the entry of the new members, as it presents the
largest longline share.
The prospective new members clearly gain by entering the RFMO after the
moratorium, but this does not threat the cooperative agreement.
Nonetheless, the threat posed by the new members does not end with the initial
decision to cooperate in the recovery of the stock. In fact, in the case of non-binding
agreements, this is a dynamic problem that tends to undermine cooperation in the long
run. At any period t each of the players evaluates if a non-cooperative strategy is
worth more than a cooperative one. Therefore, once the stock is recovered the non-
cooperative behaviour becomes more appealing.
 In order to test this argument a scenario is created in which, after the initial
harvest moratorium, new members join the RFMO and each member decides whether
to cooperate or not. Again it is assumed that if one of the original members breaks the
agreement then all the other will react non-cooperatively.
The agreement breaks if, after the moratorium, for any of the players:
( ) ( )
moratorium after the  Period A time
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The case of the non-cooperative reaction of a member to an unexpected entry
of a new member to the RFMO is also defined by the previous condition.
The following table shows the payoffs, of the cooperative and non-cooperative
strategies, at the end of the moratorium. In the case of non-cooperation it is assumed
that the original members, in the period after the moratorium, use the same effort level
as in the base year and the new members use 10% of the total longline effort of that
year.
Table 3: Payoffs by Player in the Presence of New Members at t=6
Non-Coop. Cooperative – New member Share on the longline quota
0% 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
E.U.  832.8 1674.4 1650.7 1603.3  1556.0 1508.6 1461.3
DWFN  385.8 635.0 571.5 444.5  317.5 190.5 63.5
O.C.S.  410.3 743.3 722.9 682.0  641.1 600.2 559.3
N.M.  65.4 0 107.6 322.9  538.1 753.4 968.6
Total  1694.3 3052.7 3052.7 3052.7 3052.7 3052.7 3052.7
Values in 106 USD
Table 3 shows that after the moratorium, for the DWFN, the incentive to break
the cooperative agreement increases. New members with a longline share between
30% and 50% would be sufficient to make profitable for the DWFN to break the
cooperative Agreement.   Therefore, in this scenario, the new members pose a threat
to the long run stability of the cooperative agreement.
3.3 Solutions for the New Member Problem
In this section the two possible olutions for the new member problem,
presented in section 2.2, are simulated for the East stock of the northern Atlantic
bluefin tuna.
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3.3.1 Transferable Membership
The basic premise in implementing a system of transferable membership is that
a prospective new member can only have access to the fishery by acquiring the
corresponding quota from the member countries.
In this section “transferable membership” is defined in a broad sense, as a
system in which each member can sell any share of its quota. Thus this is equivalent
to an Individual Transferable quota (ITQ) system.
According to Munro (1999) the transferable membership is expected to function
basically with DWFNs selling quota to other DWFN. In this study the scope of trade
is enlarged to all members. Thus any member is allowed to sell its share.
In the beginning of ITQ systems it is common to use restrictions on quota
transfers.  Representative examples are the implementation of this system in Iceland
(Arnason (1993)) and Canada (Crowley and Palsson (1992)). The aims of these
restrictions are usually connected with stabilising employment, in the short run, and
avoiding the consolidation of shares.
In this case study, it is assumed that the ITQs are non-transferable between
gears, as the different gears tend to correspond to specific areas. Therefore, a new
member must acquire an ITQ for the particular gear it wants to use. This scenario
gives rise to a specific market for each gear.
A standard economic result, which remains valid in multi-fleet fisheries (Garza-
Gil (1998)), is that the market price of a perpetual ITQ is equal to the present value of
the marginal returns generated by it. In this case-study the market price of a perpetual
ITQ is computed, for each gear, as the corresponding share on the Net Present Value
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of that gear - an average value, which for the particular bio-economic model used is
also the marginal return7.
Table 4 shows the market price of a perpetual ITQ corresponding to a 1% share
of the total catches, under the optimal cooperative strategy. Different discount rates,
and the respective optimal strategies, are used in order to assess the importance of this
parameter.
Table 4: Market Price of a Perpetual ITQ (1% of the Total Catch)
Discount Rate
4% 10% 20%
Longline  26,573 9,793 3,700
Purse Seine  14,068 5,184 1,959
Trap 74,084 26,761 9,492
Bait Boat 6,480 2,333 841
Remainder 50,377 18,197 6,455
Values in 103 USD
From table 4 it can be concluded that the value of the ITQ is, as expected, very
sensitive to the discount rate.
The highest ITQ prices are those of the trap and the remainder, as they present
high prices and the highest catch-stock elasticity - thus benefiting the most from the
stock recovery. In this scenario, if we assume that a new member will use longline
gear it will have to pay, with a 4% discount rate, around 26.6 million USD for a1%
share of total catches.
With this system the new entrants will have to pay for its share in order to have
access to the fishery, therefore it will only buy the share if it is at least as efficient as
the marginal longline fleet in the RFMO. This eliminates the incentives of non-
                                                 
7 The estimated profit functions are linear on catches, which results in identical marginal and average
profits for each unit of catch.
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efficient prospective new members to enter the fishery once the stock is recovered, as
the ITQ price will increase.
The ITQ system also indicates that the players with a long run interest in the
stock (more conservatives) will tend to buy the ITQs as they attribute more value to
the resource.
A problem often raised to the implementation of ITQs systems concerns the
initial allocation. How can the shares be allocated in a fair way? Is it reasonable that
nations get a free perpetual right and others that may want to enter the fishery have to
pay for it? A possible solution is to make an initial allocation based on historical
catches and also incorporate other relevant coastal states.
3.3.2 Waiting Period
In this section a fundamental question is raised: can the cooperative agreements
of the RFMO be protected by imposing a “waiting period”, in which prospective new
members cannot have access to the fishery. In order to draw some light on this issue
an hypothetical scenario is created in which the new members get a 25% share of the
longline catch8 and the other players see their longline share reduced proportionally,
relatively to the base year. With these assumptions three situations are simulated: no
entry, entry with no “waiting period” and entry with a five-year “waiting period”. In
this setting no waiting period means that the new member will start to catch, together
with the other players, just after the harvest moratorium.
Table 5 shows the payoffs for the 4 players. In order to analyse the impact of the
discount rate on the results different rates are considered.
                                                 
8 For a total catch of 40,000 MT, a 25% share of the longline catch corresponds to about 3,210 MT.
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Table 5: Payoffs of the Fishery – Waiting Period Scenario
Discount rate
4% 10% 20%
No
Entry
 0
Years
5
Years
No
Entry
 0
Years
5
Years
No
Entry
 0
Years
5
Years
EU 1327.1 1280.1 1289.8 484.2 466.9 474.2 177.6 171.1 175.6
DWFN 503.3 377.5 403,5 185.5 139.1 158.7 70.1 52.6 64.9
OCS 589.2 548.6 557.0 215.0 200.1 206.4 78.8 73.2 77.1
NM 0 213.3 169.2 0 78.6 45.4 0 29.7 8.8
Total 2419.5 2419.5 2419.5 884.7 884.7 884.7 326.5 326.5 326.5
Values in 106 USD
The results presented in table 5 show that among all the players the DWFN are
the most affected by the loss of 25% of its longline quota, due to the entry of the new
members. In fact, the DWFN is the most important player using this gear – it
represents 59% of the longline catches in the base year.
By comparing the payoffs of no “waiting period” with a 5-year “waiting
period”, it can be concluded that the introduction of a waiting period increases the
payoffs of the original members and the rate of this increase rises with the discount
rate. E.g. for a 4% discount rate the payoff of the DWFN rises 6.9%, whereas for a
20% discount rate that increase is of 23.4%. This indicates that this scheme may be
relevant in the context of high discount rates.
As in this fishery the non-cooperative strategies are not appealing in the short
run the “waiting period” mechanism, although protecting the member countries, is not
sufficient to finish the incentives to free rider behaviors by the prospective new
members. Therefore, this mechanism cannot be seen as a solution to the new member
problem in the long run.  
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 4 – The New Members in the West Atlantic Bluefin Tuna
Fishery
In this section the new member problem is discussed for the West Atlantic
stock. The analysis is similar to the one of the previous section, therefore only the
main points will be addressed. .
4.1 The Cooperative Management
Following Duarte et al. (1999), the ICCAT members can be represented by three
main players: United States of America (USA), Canada (CAN) and Distant Water
Fishing Nations (DWFN).
The optimal policy is determined, as for the East Atlantic, and a pre autionary
limit on catches is defined as a 2,500 MT9.
The optimal policy is to declare a 4 period moratorium, catch 1300 MT in the
5th period and 2500 MT thereafter - with the exception of 25th period ( 00 MT )10.
The TAC and the stock evolution are represented in Graph 2
Graph 2
                                                 
9 The model simulations show that, with the present gear mix, 2,500 MT is close to a maximum
sustainable catch, after a stock recovery through an initial harvest moratorium.
10 As it is assumed that the TAC is constant from t=26 to t=50 the optimal path calls for a TAC
decrease at t=25, in order to allow a higher initial stock for the remainder periods.
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Graph 2 shows a stock evolution that, after an initial recovery, tends towards
stabilisation, which indicates that a 2,500 MT catch, after the moratorium, is close to a
sustainable level.
By considering different discount rates it can be concluded that the optimal
policy is not sensitive to this parameter. In fact for 10% and 20% discount rates the
optimal policy is to declare a harvest moratorium of 3 and 2 years, respectively, and
catch 2,500 MT thereafter.
Let us now turn to the payoffs of the optimal strategies, which are presented in
table 6.
Table 6: Payoffs in the Cooperative Solution
Discount rate
4% 10% 20%
USA 58.6 23.2 9.5
CAN 30.2 11.8 4.8
DWFN 23.9 9.5 3.9
Total 112.7 44.5 18.2
Values in 106 USD
Table 6 shows that the discount rate has a significant impact on the payoffs. It
can also be noted that United States earns more than 50% of the total payoff.
4.2 The New Member Threat
In this section the new member threat is analysed for the West Atlantic stock
using a similar setting to the one presented for the East Atlantic stock. In particular it
is assumed that the new members are DWFN, using longline gear, which are equally
efficient to ones already in the fishery.
Table 7 shows the payoffs of the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies
evaluated in the base year.
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Table 7: Payoffs by Player in the Presence of New Members at t=0
Non Coop. Cooperative – New member Share on the longline quota
0% 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
U.S.A 0.65 58.6 58.2 57.2 56.3 55.4 54.4
CAN -0.60 30.2 30.2 30.1 30.1 30.0 30.0
DWFN 0.29 23.9 21.5 16.7 11.9 7.2 2.4
N.M. 0 0 2.9 8.6 14.4 20.1 25.9
Total 0.34 112.7 112.7 112.7 112.7 112.7 112.7
 Values in 106 USD
From table 7 it can be concluded that, in the beginning of the game, even if the
new members receive a substantial share of the longline quota it will not induce the
other players to break the cooperative agreement. The reason behind it is the depleted
state of the stock, which makes the non-cooperation a low payoff strategy.
In this case the USA and especially Canada loose very little if the new entrants
receive a share of the longline quota, as this is not a determinant gear for both nations.
If the new member share is not computed based on a specific gear but on the total
catch this asymmetry does not occur.
Let us now turn to the situation after the moratorium. The player’s payoffs are
presented in table 8.
Table 8: Payoffs by Player in the Presence of New Members at t=5
Non Coop. Cooperative – New member Share on the longline quota
0% 10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
U.S.A 39.0 68.6 68.0 67.0 65.9 64.8 63.7
CAN 19.3 35.4 35.3 35.3 35.1 35.1 35.1
DWFN 16.0 27.9 25.1 19.5 14.0 8.4 2.8
N.M. 1.9 0 3.4 10.1 16.8 23.5 30.3
Total 76.2 131.9 131.9 131.9 131.9 131.9 131.9
Values in 106 USD
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Table 8 shows that, after the moratorium, the payoofs of the non-cooperative
strategy rises substantially. Thus for the DWFN, already in the fishery, new member
shares between 30 to 50% would be sufficient to induce non-cooperation.
As in the East Atlantic, it can be concluded that the new member threat is
aggravated in the long run.
4.3 Solutions for the New Member Problem
In this section the two solutions suggested in section 2.2 are discussed for the
Western Atlantic bluefin tuna fishery.
4.3.1 Transferable Membership
As in the analysis of the East Atlantic stock the value of a perpetual ITQ is
determined.  The ITQ prices for each gear are presented in table 9.
Table 9: Market Price of a Perpetual ITQ (1% of the Total Catch)
Discount Rate
4% 10% 20%
Longline 902.1 357.5 147.7
Purse Seine 955.2 378.5 156.4
Rod & Reel 955.2 378.5 156.4
Remainder 2,559.2 996.6 396.2
Values in 103 USD
From table 9 some interesting points emerge.  The remainder gears present the
highest value for the ITQ due to its high catch-stock elasticity. For the purse seine and
the rod & reel the same ITQ price is obtained, this results from the assumptions of
equal prices and cost margins for the two gears.
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4.3.2 Waiting Period
The impact of establishing a waiting period is analysed in a hypothetical
scenario in which the new entrant receives a 25% share of the longline quota. Table
10 presents the results for different discount rates.
Table 10: Payoffs of the fishery – Waiting Period Scenario
Discount rate
4% 10% 20%
Lag No
Entry
 0
Years
5
Years
No
Entry
 0
Years
5
 Years
No
Entry
 0
Years
5
Years
USA 58.6 57.4 57.7 23.2 22.7 22.9 9.5 9.3 9.5
CAN 30.2 30.2 30.2 11.8 11.8 11.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
DWFN 23.9 17.9 19.1 9.5 7.1 8.1 3.9 2.9 3.6
NM 0 7.2 5.7 0 2.8 1.6 0 1.2 0.3
Total 112.7 112.7 112.7 44.5 44.5 44.5 18.2 18.2 18.2
Values in 106 USD
The simulation results presented in Table 10 shows that, in this scenario,
introducing a 5-year waiting period does not produce significant gains for the original
members. Nonetheless, for the DWFN these gains increase substantially with the
discount rate (6.8% and 24.1% for a 4% and 20% discount rates, respectively). As in
the beginning of the game non-cooperative strategies yield a low payoff this
mechanism clearly does not prevent possible free-rider behaviours by the new
members.
5. Concluding Remarks
The new member problem faced by the regional fisheries organisations is
presently considered as a serious threat to the cooperative management of the
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
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In this paper an economic approach to this problem is centred in a typical
highly migratory species: the northern Atlantic bluefin tuna.
 The results show that in the beginning of the game the threat of the new
members is not relevant for the breakdown of the cooperative agreement. This is due
to the very low level of the stock, which makes non-cooperation a low payoff
strategy. As the optimal cooperative strategy calls for an initial harvest moratorium
the threat becomes progressively more relevant, showing that this is a dynamic
problem which is aggravated in the long run.
The simulation results for the two proposed solutions emphasise the
importance of the discount rate. In fact the price of the transferable quotas are very
sensitive to this parameter and the impact of the “waiting period” is especially
relevant for high discount rates.
One main conclusion is that the “transferable membership” solution, by
issuing property rights, is globally efficient in protecting the cooperative agreements
of the regional fisheries organisations from the free rider actions of the prospective
new members. The waiting period solution although enhancing the cooperative
agreements in the short run does not solve the new member problem in the long run.
This is especially true in cases of highly depleted stocks, as is the present state of the
bluefin tuna.
In the complex world scenario in fisheries it is not clear which solution will be
adopted by the regional fisheries organizations regarding the entry of new members,
but surely strong economic forces must be in action in order to avoid the threat of free
riding behaviors.  The two solutions discussed, and especially the ITQ system, can be
good milestones to implement these forces as they provide economic incentives in the
right direction.
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